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Control right include two elements: (1) control right in shareholder meeting, 
that is, voting control, which is represented by voting right; (2) real control in the 
board. Recently, the impact of ownership and control on performance is one of study 
focus in the field of corporate finance. In these studies, control right is represented 
only by voting right without consideration of real control in the board, voting control 
is treated equally as real control. Control right may affect corporate performance by 
exerting influence on the decision to use of corporate assets, which is the consequence 
of interaction effect of both voting control and real control. The previous studies 
examining the impact of control right in shareholder meeting and real control in the 
board on performance, focus one of these two elements alone, or examine both 
elements separately. This study will examine the relation of voting control and real 
control by the first large shareholder, which is defined as control mode, and the 
impact of control mode on corporate performance, under the institution of ‘one share 
one vote’ and‘majority rule’. The conclusions have been made as follows: 
1.The relationship between voting control and real control may be combined 
or separated. For the first large shareholder, voting control is not definitely equal to 
real control, on the other hand, real control is not definitely based on the voting 
control. There are four types of relation between voting control and real control: high 
voting control with high real control (HIHI), high voting control with low real control 
(HILO), low voting control with high real control (LOHI), low voting control with 
low real control (LOLO). Discretion on corporate assets is interacted by both voting 
control and real control, which may affect on corporate performance. The interaction 
effect of voting control and real control on corporate performance must be different 
with the impact of voting control and real control on corporate performance 
separately. 
2. The control mode by the first large shareholder in Chinese listed company is 
dominated by high voting control with high real control (HIHI), the second is low 















control with low real control (HILO), as well as low voting control with low real 
control (LOLO) is comparatively lower. The first large shareholder controlled by 
government is predominant in voting control, and more likely adopt HIHI mode. On 
the other hand, the first large shareholder controlled by entrepreneur is not prevalent 
in voting control, but higher motivation for real control, and is more likely to adopt 
LOHI mode. 
3. The control mode has significant impact on corporate performance. In 
general, HIHI mode enjoys highest performance but LOLO mode has negative effect 
on the performance. For the government-controlled company, there is positive and 
dominant effect on performance by voting control, in contrast, for the 
entrepreneur-controlled company, there is positive and dominant effect on 
performance by real control. 
4. There is no evidence that corporate performance in government-controlled 
company is worse than that controlled by entrepreneur. HIHI and LOLO mode has the 
same impact on corporate performance in both government-controlled company and 
entrepreneur-controlled company, HIHI mode has positive effects but LOLO mode 
has negative impacts. However, LOHI mode has positive impacts on corporate 
performance in entrepreneur-controlled company but negative effects in 
government-controlled company. On the other hand, HILO mode has positive effects 
on corporate performance in government-controlled company but negative impacts in 
entrepreneur-controlled company. 
5. When holding voting control, whether the first large shareholder hold real 
control right does not have significant impacts on corporate performance in 
government-controlled company. However, with certain level of real control, whether 
the first large shareholder hold voting control right does not have significant effects 
on corporate performance in entrepreneur-controlled company.  
The contributions in this study are as follows: 
1. This study extend the perspective of separation of ownership and control 
from voting control in shareholder meeting to real control in the board, and examine 















provide different evidence for the relation between ownership, control and 
performance from another perspective. 
2. By the view of relation between voting control and real control, there are 
four types of control modes by the first large shareholder: high voting control with 
high real control, high voting control with low real control, low voting control with 
high real control, low voting control with low real control. This study tests the relation 
between voting control and real control by empirical analysis and finds that voting 
control does not definitely result in real control and the real control is not definitely 
based on voting control. 
3. By estimating critical voting control for the first large shareholder with 
ownership proportion lower than 50% by probability voting model and measuring the 
real control in the board, it is the first time to empirically examine the interaction 
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第一章  导   论 
第一节 问题的提出 






















A 股上市公司第一大股东的持股比例平均在 44.26%，40%以上的中国 A 股上市



















公司第一大股东的持股比例超过 50%。在截止 2003 年 6 月 20 日已披露 2002 年
年报的 734 家上市公司中，2002 年底第一大股东持股比例高于 50%的公司占总













































不同的答案？   




















值 高。 Shleifer and Vishny（1986）的研究表明拥有较高比例所有权的大股东，
在其没有参与公司管理的情况下，具有监督公司内部管理层的能力和积极性，从
而有效解决所有权分散时小股东对管理层监督不足的问题，有利于提高公司的价






















































































                                                        



































事为主的董事会在监督 CEO 方面做得更好（Weishach, 1988）。此外，当董事长
和 CEO 两职合一时，CEO 更替对公司业绩的敏感度明显更低（Goyal and Park，
2001）。 
在股权集中的情况下，大股东通常亲自担任董事长或总经理和占据董（监）
事会一定比例的席位来强化控制权。La porta et.al.(1999)对全球 27 个国家的研究
发现，在家族 终控制的企业中，控制性家族担任公司 CEO、董事长、名誉董
事长或付董事长的比例达到 69%。这一比例在东亚九个国家平均达到 57.1%，在
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